The article is based on an analysis of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This provision, sets out the general rule of the prohibition of agreements between companies that may distort competition, with an exception for agreements that contribute to improving the production of products. The author, based on international and European provisions, proposes an interpretation of “production improvement” also in an environmental sense. This interpretation could justify agreements between companies that, while contrary to the application of competition principles, move towards sustainable production (so-called sustainability agreements), even if they do not reflect the application of the competition principle. The competition principle, emerges clearly in the Italian Environmental Code and is applied in waste regulation and Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) systems. The author believes that this principle, on the one hand, is crucial to encourage sustainable production and economic efficiency but, on the other hand, should not be considered an absolute principle. Indeed, sustainable production requires exceptions to the principle itself, but only to the strict extent necessary.
L’articolo prende spunto dall’analisi dell’art. 101 TFUE. Tale norma nel porre la regola generale del divieto degli accordi tra imprese che possono falsare il gioco della concorrenza prevede un’eccezione per quegli accordi che contribuiscono a migliorare la produzione di prodotti. L’A. richiama le norme di diritto internazionale e di diritto europeo che legittimano la lettura di tale miglioramento della produzione anche in senso ambientale. Tale lettura consente di confermare le interpretazioni che legittimano accordi tra imprese che, pur contrari all’applicazione dei principi concorrenziali, si muovono nella direzione della produzione sostenibile (cd. sustainability agreements). L’A. ritiene che il principio di concorrenza che emerge ormai chiaramente nel Testo Unico Ambientale (TUA) e che viene applicato nella regolazione dei rifiuti e nei sistemi di Responsabilità Estesa del Produttore (EPR), da una parte, sia determinante per incentivare la produzione sostenibile e l'efficienza economica ma, dall’altra, allo stesso tempo non debba essere considerato come principio assoluto. La produzione sostenibile porta, infatti, ad ammettere deroghe al principio stesso ma solo nella misura in cui sia strettamente necessario.
DE LEONARDIS, F. (2024). Concorrenza e ambiente: “conflitto” o “concorso”? Alcune riflessioni sui sustainability agreements di cui all’art. 101, par. 3 TFUE. RIVISTA QUADRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO DELL’AMBIENTE(3/2023), 175-192.
Concorrenza e ambiente: “conflitto” o “concorso”? Alcune riflessioni sui sustainability agreements di cui all’art. 101, par. 3 TFUE
FRANCESCO DE LEONARDIS
2024-01-01
Abstract
The article is based on an analysis of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This provision, sets out the general rule of the prohibition of agreements between companies that may distort competition, with an exception for agreements that contribute to improving the production of products. The author, based on international and European provisions, proposes an interpretation of “production improvement” also in an environmental sense. This interpretation could justify agreements between companies that, while contrary to the application of competition principles, move towards sustainable production (so-called sustainability agreements), even if they do not reflect the application of the competition principle. The competition principle, emerges clearly in the Italian Environmental Code and is applied in waste regulation and Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) systems. The author believes that this principle, on the one hand, is crucial to encourage sustainable production and economic efficiency but, on the other hand, should not be considered an absolute principle. Indeed, sustainable production requires exceptions to the principle itself, but only to the strict extent necessary.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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