The literature on moral responsibility widely focuses on the agential and epistemic criteria subserving fair accountability attributions. Extant frameworks tend to single out criteria that are then analyzed separately. In this paper, I develop a critique of such “monistic” approaches and propose an alternative, which is centered around the notion of autonomy as a multi-layered and dynamic set of criteria. Presented as adaptable to less-than-ideal circumstances, such criteria are, however, not to be intended as individually necessary; instead, they can mutually supplement each other and collectively contribute to determining responsibility in a dynamic manner.
Bonicalzi, S. (2024). A Multi-Layered View of Autonomy as the Foundation of Moral Responsibility. PARADIGMI, 1-17 [10.30460/114665].
A Multi-Layered View of Autonomy as the Foundation of Moral Responsibility
Sofia Bonicalzi
2024-01-01
Abstract
The literature on moral responsibility widely focuses on the agential and epistemic criteria subserving fair accountability attributions. Extant frameworks tend to single out criteria that are then analyzed separately. In this paper, I develop a critique of such “monistic” approaches and propose an alternative, which is centered around the notion of autonomy as a multi-layered and dynamic set of criteria. Presented as adaptable to less-than-ideal circumstances, such criteria are, however, not to be intended as individually necessary; instead, they can mutually supplement each other and collectively contribute to determining responsibility in a dynamic manner.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.