L’ontologie du plaisir dans le Philèbe et le vocabulaire platonicien de l'être

This paper examines the ontological foundations of the antihedonist argument at Philebus 53c4-55a1. I shall argue that the use of the notions of γένεσις and οὐσία in this argument shows neither an alleged rejection of the opposition between sensibles and intelligibles; nor, on the other hand, a mechanical application of that very thesis. Instead, I aim at showing that these notions enjoy a semantic relativity such that their meaning varies depending on the different argumentative contexts and that, in this Philebus passage, they respectively designate a genetic process and a whole that is constituted by the causal imposition of a limit to what is itself unlimited. Based on this solution, I shall propose a new reading of the relationship between Philebus 53c4-55a1 and the characterization of each member of the ‘third genus’ as γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν (26d8) and γεγενημένη οὐσία (27b8-9).