The article analyses the issue of Internet access and digital divide, also considering Covid-19 health emergency. The Author acknowledges that Internet is now a fundamental prerequisite for exercising civil and political rights and for developing individual's personality. Therefore, retracing doctrinal orientations developed on Internet access, he believes that it should not be configured as a right but a mere functional instrument for exercising fundamental rights. Hence the need to shift the centre of gravity of the issue from the right to the instrument to the effectiveness of the right exercisable through the instrument. Therefore, without the need to include Internet access in the list of (fundamental) rights, it is argued that it must be subsumed in the context of the public service, and in particular in the universal service. This in fact would entail the undoubted advantage - with the Constitution unchanged - of not excluding any segment of the population from the Internet service (it would be better, from broadband connection). All this is also investigated from the visual angle of Covid-19 health emergency, which has sharpened digital divide and that made the intervention of the legislator necessary to better guarantee Internet access, since through the remote connection (and only through it) it was possible to exercise certain fundamental rights during the lockdown.
Lotta, C. (2020). Un nuovo diritto al tempo del Covid-19? Accesso a Internet e digital divide. GRUPPO DI PISA(2), 61-71.
Un nuovo diritto al tempo del Covid-19? Accesso a Internet e digital divide
Lotta, Cosimo
2020-01-01
Abstract
The article analyses the issue of Internet access and digital divide, also considering Covid-19 health emergency. The Author acknowledges that Internet is now a fundamental prerequisite for exercising civil and political rights and for developing individual's personality. Therefore, retracing doctrinal orientations developed on Internet access, he believes that it should not be configured as a right but a mere functional instrument for exercising fundamental rights. Hence the need to shift the centre of gravity of the issue from the right to the instrument to the effectiveness of the right exercisable through the instrument. Therefore, without the need to include Internet access in the list of (fundamental) rights, it is argued that it must be subsumed in the context of the public service, and in particular in the universal service. This in fact would entail the undoubted advantage - with the Constitution unchanged - of not excluding any segment of the population from the Internet service (it would be better, from broadband connection). All this is also investigated from the visual angle of Covid-19 health emergency, which has sharpened digital divide and that made the intervention of the legislator necessary to better guarantee Internet access, since through the remote connection (and only through it) it was possible to exercise certain fundamental rights during the lockdown.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.