Libertà di Dio, libertà dell’uomo Osservazioni sulla posizione di Giovanni Duns Scoto

John Duns Scotus’s doctrine of free will has been the subject of a lively historiographical debate in recent decades, primarily focusing on whether Scotus supported a «mitigated» or «unmitigated» voluntarism. This article presents an overview of Scotus’s doctrine, highlighting the importance of the distinction between nature and will. It then addresses several theoretical issues, aiming to move beyond the question of the radicality of his voluntarism: the way Scotus challenges the Aristotelian notion of appetitus as applied to free will; the use of Anselm’s distinction between affectio commodi and affectio iustitiae to define the nature of the will; the absence of necessity in the relationship between free will and the ultimate end; and the inadequacy of the intellect in capturing the inner essence of freedom.