COMMENTARY ON P. PERCONTI, “RETHINKING SUBJECTIVITY: THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS"

The authors concur with Pietro Perconti’s thesis that conceptual self-awareness is a by-product of social cognition. However, the authors question some aspects of his theory, particularly the dual-process account dividing mindreading into System 1 (low-level simulation) and System 2 (high-level simulation). This distinction is problematic because it simplifies the complex nature of mindreading, which involves both Theory Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST). High-level mindreading, which includes cognitive processes like perspective-taking and counterfactual imagination, contrasts sharply with low-level mindreading processes, which are automatic and involve simple mirroring. Furthermore, the Simulationist model’s neo-Cartesian view on simulation as projection is inconsistent with a “mindreading first” approach, which suggests that self-knowledge develops in parallel with knowledge of others. Additionally, the authors argue that conceptual self-consciousness cannot solely be explained through social interactions and that other mechanisms, like adaptive traits, play significant roles. The social cognition framework must integrate these perspectives and acknowledge the developmental origins and varied functions of consciousness.