Our main claim is that Bohr adopted a principle-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics in order to reconcile two principles: the distinction principle, which asserts a clear epistemic distinction between a classical apparatus and a quantum system, and the non-separability principle, which asserts that the two systems are ontologically non-separable in any measurement process. The latter principle is a consequence of Bohr's argument that, during a measurement interaction, the quantum system and the measurement apparatus become entangled by forming a 'new kind of individuality'. To support our argument, we first demonstrate the overlooked fact that, according to Bohr, the measurement interaction is a physical, irreversible process and not merely an epistemic acquisition of new information. Quantum mechanics must be regarded not only as a universal theory, but also as having no non-arbitrary difference between a quantum realm and a classical realm; the distinction is purely pragmatic. The tension between the epistemic necessity to rely on a neatly distinguishable classical realm and the ontic entanglement of the quantum system with the classical apparatus inclined Bohr to refuse to provide a constructive account of the measurement process, such as that later proposed by GRW
Dorato, M. (In corso di stampa). with Jan Faye, Bohr as a Physicist of Principle. PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON SERIES A: MATHEMATICAL PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES.
with Jan Faye, Bohr as a Physicist of Principle
Mauro Dorato
In corso di stampa
Abstract
Our main claim is that Bohr adopted a principle-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics in order to reconcile two principles: the distinction principle, which asserts a clear epistemic distinction between a classical apparatus and a quantum system, and the non-separability principle, which asserts that the two systems are ontologically non-separable in any measurement process. The latter principle is a consequence of Bohr's argument that, during a measurement interaction, the quantum system and the measurement apparatus become entangled by forming a 'new kind of individuality'. To support our argument, we first demonstrate the overlooked fact that, according to Bohr, the measurement interaction is a physical, irreversible process and not merely an epistemic acquisition of new information. Quantum mechanics must be regarded not only as a universal theory, but also as having no non-arbitrary difference between a quantum realm and a classical realm; the distinction is purely pragmatic. The tension between the epistemic necessity to rely on a neatly distinguishable classical realm and the ontic entanglement of the quantum system with the classical apparatus inclined Bohr to refuse to provide a constructive account of the measurement process, such as that later proposed by GRWI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


