This paper examines the directors' duties in M&A transactions, adopting as its perspective the position of the company that is party to the transaction, namely the distinction between the acquiring company and the target company. The analysis proceeds from a narrow notion of corporate interest, confined to the shareholders' interest in the profitability and value of their investment. For the acquiring company, the emphasis falls on the duty of care under Article 2392 of the Civil Code, within the scope of the business judgment rule. For the target company, the duty of loyalty and impartiality towards shareholders under Articles 2391 and 2391-bis prevails, particularly in hostile acquisitions. The paper rejects any duty to hold a competitive auction but admits the "exclusive" undertakings of negotiated deals (no-shop, no-talk, break-up fee), also in light of the new Article 112-bis t.u.f. (a new form of takeover modelled after the English scheme of arrangement). The directors' fiduciary duty to present all available options to shareholders transparently and exhaustively remains firm.
Il lavoro analizza i doveri degli amministratori nelle operazioni di M&A assumendo come angolo visuale la posizione della società parte dell'operazione, ossia la distinzione tra società acquirente e società acquisita. L'indagine muove da una nozione circoscritta di interesse sociale, confinata all'interesse dei soci alla redditività e al valore della partecipazione. Per la società acquirente l'accento cade sul dovere di diligenza ex art. 2392 c.c., entro l'ambito della business judgment rule. Per la società acquisita prevale il dovere di lealtà e imparzialità verso i soci ex artt. 2391 e 2391-bis c.c., specie nelle acquisizioni ostili. Il saggio esclude un obbligo di indire un'asta competitiva, ma ammette la legittimità di impegni "esclusivi" delle operazioni concordate (no-shop, no-talk, break-up fee), anche alla luce del nuovo art. 112-bis t.u.f. Resta fermo il dovere fiduciario di rappresentare in modo trasparente ed esaustivo tutte le opzioni disponibili ai soci.
Maugeri, M. (2025). Sui doveri degli amministratori nelle operazioni di M&A. RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ(5-6), 874-891.
Sui doveri degli amministratori nelle operazioni di M&A
Marco Maugeri
2025-01-01
Abstract
This paper examines the directors' duties in M&A transactions, adopting as its perspective the position of the company that is party to the transaction, namely the distinction between the acquiring company and the target company. The analysis proceeds from a narrow notion of corporate interest, confined to the shareholders' interest in the profitability and value of their investment. For the acquiring company, the emphasis falls on the duty of care under Article 2392 of the Civil Code, within the scope of the business judgment rule. For the target company, the duty of loyalty and impartiality towards shareholders under Articles 2391 and 2391-bis prevails, particularly in hostile acquisitions. The paper rejects any duty to hold a competitive auction but admits the "exclusive" undertakings of negotiated deals (no-shop, no-talk, break-up fee), also in light of the new Article 112-bis t.u.f. (a new form of takeover modelled after the English scheme of arrangement). The directors' fiduciary duty to present all available options to shareholders transparently and exhaustively remains firm.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


