We consider the problem of Internet switching, where traffic is generated by selfish users. We study a packetized (TCP-like) traffic model, which is more realistic than the widely used fluid model. We assume that routers have First-In-First-Out (FIFO) buffers of bounded capacity managed by the drop-tail policy. The utility of each user depends on its transmission rate and the congestion level. Since selfish users try to maximize their own utility disregarding the system objectives, we study Nash equilibria that correspond to a steady state of the system. We quantify the degradation in the network performance called the price of anarchy resulting from such selfish behavior. We show that for a single bottleneck buffer, the price of anarchy is proportional to the number of users. Then we propose a simple modification of the Random Early Detection (RED) drop policy, which reduces the price of anarchy to a constant. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.
Kesselman, A., Leonardi, S., & Bonifaci, V. (2005). Game-theoretic analysis of Internet switching with selfish users. In Proc. 1st Int. Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (pp.236-245). Berlin : Springer.
|Titolo:||Game-theoretic analysis of Internet switching with selfish users|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2005|
|Citazione:||Kesselman, A., Leonardi, S., & Bonifaci, V. (2005). Game-theoretic analysis of Internet switching with selfish users. In Proc. 1st Int. Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (pp.236-245). Berlin : Springer.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||4.1 Contributo in Atti di convegno|