We show how a symmetric game with incomplete information can be represented by an influence diagram. Object-oriented Bayesian networks allow its extension to a repeated game where the uncertainty about a further stage is modelled via a suitable Bayesian network connected to the influence diagram. Based on real cases of financial intermediation mergers a decision support system is built and its use is illustrated in different scenarios.
Vicard, P., Mortera, J. (2012). A decision support system for duopolies with incomplete information. In Proceedings of the XLVI Scientific Meeting. Padova : CLEUP.
A decision support system for duopolies with incomplete information
VICARD, Paola;MORTERA, Julia
2012-01-01
Abstract
We show how a symmetric game with incomplete information can be represented by an influence diagram. Object-oriented Bayesian networks allow its extension to a repeated game where the uncertainty about a further stage is modelled via a suitable Bayesian network connected to the influence diagram. Based on real cases of financial intermediation mergers a decision support system is built and its use is illustrated in different scenarios.File in questo prodotto:
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