We show how a symmetric game with incomplete information can be represented by an influence diagram. Object-oriented Bayesian networks allow its extension to a repeated game where the uncertainty about a further stage is modelled via a suitable Bayesian network connected to the influence diagram. Based on real cases of financial intermediation mergers a decision support system is built and its use is illustrated in different scenarios.

Vicard, P., Mortera, J. (2012). A decision support system for duopolies with incomplete information. In Proceedings of the XLVI Scientific Meeting. Padova : CLEUP.

A decision support system for duopolies with incomplete information

VICARD, Paola;MORTERA, Julia
2012-01-01

Abstract

We show how a symmetric game with incomplete information can be represented by an influence diagram. Object-oriented Bayesian networks allow its extension to a repeated game where the uncertainty about a further stage is modelled via a suitable Bayesian network connected to the influence diagram. Based on real cases of financial intermediation mergers a decision support system is built and its use is illustrated in different scenarios.
978-88-6129-882-8
Vicard, P., Mortera, J. (2012). A decision support system for duopolies with incomplete information. In Proceedings of the XLVI Scientific Meeting. Padova : CLEUP.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11590/279140
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact